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1. INTRODUCTION
The wireless network systems and the Internet are two 
basic and crucial systems of present generation networking1. 
The increasing demand for improvement in wireless 
communication to meet various requirements of mobile multi-
media operations for extensive internet browsing, uninterrupted 
online audio and video streaming, interactive gaming, mobile 
TV etc., led to standardisation of third generation partnership 
project2-3. The next generation broadband wireless mobile 
network system standardised as 4G has an architectural design 
with less network elements, but improves security, speed, 
reliability, capacity, coverage and performance as a whole4. The 
LTE network architecture comprises of three main components 
as shown in Fig. 1.                                             
The first component, user equipment (UE), is a 
mobile equipment (ME). The evolved base stations, 
called eNodeB (eNB) that control the mobiles in one or more 
cells are part of the second component, the evolved UMTS 
terrestrial radio access network (E-UTRAN). The radio 
communications between the UE and the evolved packet core 
(EPC) are controlled by E-UTRAN. The third component 
EPC consists of four entities: Home subscriber server (HSS) 
that stores details about the network operator’s subscribers, 
mobility management entity (MME) which interacts with HSS 
to provide authentication for the UE, packet data network 
gateway (P-GW) that communicates with packet data networks 
using SGi interface, and serving gateway (S-GW) which is 
responsible for forwarding data between P-GW and the base 
station.
In spite of the increased security, 4G network is still 
open to attacks and has security issues. The trusted and non-
trusted locations of 4G architecture are also described in 
Fig. 1. Cryptographic protection is required in the link that 
connects eNB to the core network where internet key exchange 
and the IP security protocol are employed. The eNB is the prime 
location susceptible to attacks where user traffic is threatened 
to be exposed. Hence it is necessary that it offers a secure 
environment for the execution of critical operations, like the 
encryption or decryption of data and handling key storage for 
secure user communication. One must also take into account 
that if an attack is successful on eNB, the attackers gain control 
of eNB operations, which in turn will affect its signalling to 
UEs and other nodes. 
To ensure protection against such attacks, 4G LTE uses 
three sets of cryptographic algorithms, as packet system 
encryption algorithms (EEA) and evolved packet system 
integrity algorithms (EIA). The first set is 128-EEA1/128-
EIA1, based on SNOW 3G algorithms, the second is 128-
EEA2/128-EIA2, based on advanced encryption standard 
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(AES) algorithm and uses 128 bits, 192 bits, or 256 bits with a 
128-bit input message, and the third is 128-EEA3/128-EIA3, 
based on ZUC algorithm. However, these algorithms have their 
own drawbacks which can compromise the security of the LTE 
network5. Attackers practice and perform cryptanalysis, which 
is a study of mathematical and algebraic techniques that make 
use of vulnerabilities in cryptographic algorithms. Some of the 
attacks such as collision attack, meet-in-the-middle, 
differential fault attack (DFA) on ZUC and SNOW 
3G and particle swarm optimisation attack on AES6-
10 can successfully retrieve the key and crack into the 
network. Here, diagonal fault attack, a type of DFA, 
performed on AES is focussed in this paper.
The advanced encryption standard (AES) has 
been a popular target for fault attacks as it is the 
global standard for sensitive data encryption. The 
basic principle of a fault attack is to induce faults into 
cryptographic implementations to reveal their internal 
states and hence find the secret key using different 
fault injection methods which include variation of 
temperature, clock frequency and supply voltage, 
clock glitches etc. Moradi9, et al. suggested two fault 
models that cover all the possible faults on the input 
of Mix Columns in round 9 of AES-128. Both the 
models were shown to be successful and have high 
coverage rates. Subsequently, Dusart10, et al. revealed 
that AES is sensitive to fault analysis by implementing this 
attack on a personal computer. The investigation retrieved the 
full AES-128 key by analysing less than 50 cipher texts.
Subsequently, an execution of a fault attack on AES-128 
by injecting a fault in one of the diagonals of the state matrix 
was examined by Saha11, et al. Here, the diagonal fault attack 
was introduced by inducing a fault in the 8th round as shown 
in Fig. 2. After byte sub, shift row and mix column operations 
of the 8th round, the fault spread to the entire column. By the 
end of the 9th round, the fault spread to the entire state matrix. 
However, the bytes of each of the four columns of the matrix 
show some inter-relations among them, which can be exploited 
to reduce the key space. After the final i.e. the 10th round, we 
obtain a faulty cipher text. An exclusive-OR (XOR) operation 
is performed on the faulty cipher text and a fault-free cipher 
text, each with the tenth round key matrix and the two results 
are further applied to XOR to provide us the derived sub-key 
as shown in Fig. 3.
The key matrix used in tenth round is as follows,
00 01 02 03
10 11 12 13
10
20 21 22 23
30 31 32 33
K K K K
K K K K
K K
K K K K
K K K K
 
 
 =  
 
   
Four sets of equations were derived while considering the 
fault in the first diagonal of the state matrix b11. The attacker 
obtains reduced solution spaces for the unknowns K00, K13, K22 
and K31 using the first set of equations as follows,
00 00 13 13ISB(c1 + K ) + ISB(c1 + T1 + K ) = 2[ISB(c8 +K ) + ISB(c8 + T5 + K )] 
00 00 13 13ISB(c1 + K ) + ISB(c1 + T1 + K ) = 2[ISB(c8 +K ) + ISB(c8 + T5 + K )]                          (1)
13 13 22 22ISB(c8 + K ) + ISB(c8 + T5 + K ) = ISB(c11 +K ) + ISB(c11 + T9 + K )
 
13 13 22 22ISB(c8 + K ) + ISB(c8 + T5 + K ) = ISB(c11 +K ) + ISB(c11 + T9 + K )                     (2)
31 31
13 13
13 13
ISB(c14 + K ) + ISB(c14 + T13 + K )
         = 2[ISB(c8 +K ) + ISB(c8 + T5 + K )] +
[ISB(c8 +K ) + ISB(c8 + T5 + K )]
        
(3)
Figure 1. Core network of LTE.
Figure 2. Fault induced in round 8 propagates throughout the 
matrix in the subsequent rounds.
Figure 3. Sub-key derivation from fault-free and faulty cipher 
text.
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Here ISB denotes inverse substitute bytes operation of 
AES. The unknowns (K01, K10, K23, K32), (K02, K11, K20, K33) 
and (K03, K12, K21, K30) are obtained by three more similar sets 
of equations.
Various prevention methods were proposed to increase 
the security of AES against fault attacks; by adding redundant 
and dummy rounds as discussed by Gierlichs12, et al. by 
suggesting randomised infective countermeasures13. In this 
paper, an enhanced preventive countermeasure is proposed by 
integrating non-linear and linear diffusion techniques to make 
AES less prone to fault attacks and therefore increasing the 
protection in the secure environment where AES is used for 
encryption.
2. RELATED WORK
The introduction of fault attacks has encouraged 
researchers to explore different ways to prevent them. 
Preventive measures that make use of infective computation 
given by Gierlichs12, et al. ensures that if an attacker injects a 
fault into dummy or redundant round it will not prove useful 
in obtaining sensitive information on the AES key. Hence it 
would not be required for AES to perform a check on whether 
a fault has occurred.
 However, the localisation of fault diffusion has proven 
this method vulnerable, which led Ghosh13, et al to propose 
a practical solution for DFA using linear diffusion function 
(LDF) and randomised non-linear mixing function. A linear 
function that satisfies the strict avalanche criterion is known 
to have a higher diffusion power. A random mask was 
introduced with the diffused fault from LDF using some 
nonlinear function because non-linearity will protect against 
attackers using algebraic and differential attacks on the linear 
function. Nevertheless, the hardware setup used for this 
method is not cost efficient. Also employing LDF increases 
the number of rounds where diffusion is performed and all 
these rounds will run every time whether or not a fault has 
been encountered.
Furthermore, according to Panda14, et al. the AES is more 
secure if there is a higher number of non-linear operations 
being performed. Thus they incorporate the two fundamental 
principles of cryptography: Confusion (nonlinear Cellular 
Automata rule) and Diffusion (linear Cellular Automata rule) 
operations. The authors have made use of Periodic Boundary 
Cellular Automata rules and other non-linear functions that 
provide permutation and transposition of the state matrix. 
But the algorithm by Panda et al has come up with an idea to 
replace AES as such. 
Hence, our proposed method suggests on enhancing 
the current fault attack prevention method in AES by 
introducing a new function, DiffuseFault which is a 
combination of linear and nonlinear cellular automata 
rules (achieving efficient diffusion of the fault), 
performed for subsequent rounds after the fault has been 
identified. This ensures that the attacker will not be able 
to retrieve the plain text even if he or she is aware of the 
fault location as the fault has been sufficiently diffused 
into the state matrix.
3. PROPOSED METHOD
The prevention method described by Ghosh13, et al 
assumes two inputs, a faulty cipher text and a fault-free cipher 
text and then feeds that output to their linear diffusion function. 
In the case that a fault is not injected, the linear diffusion 
and randomised mixing functions are called anyway, though 
not required. Our proposed method does not consider that 
assumption and detects the fault as soon as it has been injected 
with the help of redundant rounds. Redundant rounds (every 
round is repeated with the output of the previous round, in 
order to check for a disparity in outputs) help to make certain 
that a fault was not entered into the current round. It is repeated 
after every round as it is possible that the fault may have been 
injected in any of the ten rounds of AES. As given in Fig. 4, if 
the fault has been detected, the resulting output of the current 
round is fed into a function, DiffuseFault(), which with the 
help of linear cellular automata rules and non-linear functions 
guarantees that the fault is diffused well into the state matrix. 
Figure 4. Proposed method: Block diagram.
Figure 5. Pseudocode - modification in AES.
In contrast to the existing countermeasure, our method 
also ensures that a fault-free cipher text is not made to enter 
into any other function, allowing the rounds of AES to proceed 
as usual.
In the pseudocode given in Fig. 5, when i is less than or 
equal to n, normal operations of AES like Sub Bytes, Shift 
Rows, Mix Columns, Add Round Key take place. However, 
if the XOR of the outputs of the current round and redundant 
round inside the CheckZero function does not return 0, the 
program breaks and control is immediately transferred to the 
DiffuseFault function. If the result of CheckZero is 0, the 
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program continues normally, executing the next rounds of 
AES.
DiffuseFault() function
As described by Panda14, et al. a function is said to be 
linear if it satisfies: f(x+y)= f(x) +f(y) Non-linear functions are 
those that do not satisfy this property. A variation of the method 
proposed by Panda14, et al. is employed in the proposed system 
to bring about the fault diffusion procedure. The linear functions 
used are periodic boundary cellular automata (PBCA), and 
6XOR operation in PBCA. The non-linear functions used are 
Complement and Substitute Bytes operation. Cellular automata 
(CA) rules define how the next state of the particular cell value 
is affected by the current state of its neighbours15. In 2D eight 
neighbourhood CA, the value in the cell is affected by its eight 
neighbours by eight CA rules, also known as the fundamental 
rules of CA given in Fig. 6.
64 128 256
32 1 2
16 8 4
Figure 6. Cellular automata rules.
The PBCA is the type of CA where the boundaries of 
the matrix are connected, which is the second step of the 
DiffuseFault procedure, as shown in Fig. 7. The diffusion 
procedure is iterated eight times and finally, the fault diffused 
cipher text is made visible to the attacker.
does the need for separate functions to perform both operations, 
and also diffuses the fault effectively and rapidly throughout 
the state matrix in fewer numbers of rounds as shown in 
Table 1. 
Table 1. Comparison analysis of types of operations 
Countermeasure 
using fault 
randomisation13
Proposed method
No. of iterations 
of CA in a single 
round of diffusion 
function
15 4
No. of non-linear 
operations in a 
single round of 
diffusion function 
-
(randomised non-
linear mixing is 
performed after 
linear diffusion 
function)
3
(Non-linear 
operations integrated 
with linear diffusion 
within same 
function)
Number of 
operations in a 
single round of 
diffusion function
15 7
Number of rounds 
required for 
efficient diffusion
17 8
The total number of rounds required for diffusion of the 
fault in the existing countermeasure is constant regardless of 
whether a fault has been injected, or in which round it has been 
injected. As mentioned earlier, in case of no fault injection, 
the proposed method allows AES to continue its operations as 
per usual, with only the inclusion of redundant rounds. This 
is a significant reduction in the time taken for the prevention 
mechanism in the case of fault-free cipher text when compared 
to the existing countermeasure which would call its diffusion 
and randomised non-linear mixing operations anyway. In the 
proposed method, the total number of rounds required for 
prevention also varies with the round in which the fault has 
been injected, which is not the case in the existing method, as 
depicted in Fig. 8. 
Figure 8. Number of rounds required to spread the fault 
throughout the matrix. 
Figure 7. Pseudocode – DiffuseFault().
4. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
This section describes the performance evaluation of the 
existing countermeasure and the proposed method.
Linear functions can provide good diffusion property if 
iterated sufficient number of times. However, using only linear 
functions would not prove useful as the attacker might be able 
to use efficient algebraic attacks to recover the key. Hence, the 
authors13 have implemented a randomised non-linear mixing 
function (also iterated specific number of times) that provides 
some non-linearity in the output cipher text. If the non-linear 
function is compromised, it would be easier for the attacker to 
derive the key. Our method combines the properties of both 
linear and non-linear functions within a single function itself, 
entangling the key within the cipher text, thereby complicating 
the relationship between the key, plaintext and cipher text. It 
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Though AES is already a combination of linear and non-
linear functions, the interrelations among the rows of the 
matrix have made it vulnerable to fault attacks, as shown in 
detail in Section 2. However, this specific combination of linear 
functions that are based on cellular automata rules and non-
linear functions ensures that there are no inter-relations among 
them and hence cannot be exploited to gather information 
about the key. 
The proposed method is a software implementation, 
developed and executed on a personal computer. Software 
based encryptions are more prevalent today than hardware 
based encryptions, as they are more scalable, easy to use 
and understand, and importantly, are cost effective. The 
field programmable gate array (FPGA) platform used in13 is 
expensive and impractical to be incorporated into AES for 
wide use. Linear diffusion and fault randomisation involves 
execution of a loop multiple number of times for many rounds, 
which would take considerable amount of time. Usage of 
FPGAs would result in lesser computation time, and as a result, 
provide better performance for complex operations. However, 
the proposed method involves the computation of much less 
number of rounds, as compared to the existing system, and can 
be easily implemented in software, with the execution times as 
shown in Table 2.
Table 2. Fault induced in round vs execution time
Fault induced in round number Execution time (s)
2 0.438
3 0.516
4 0.641
5 1.29
6 1.344
7 1.47
8 1.625
9 1.647
From Fig. 9, it is seen that if the fault is induced in a later 
round, the algorithm would take more time to execute. This 
is evident as the algorithm stops its execution and switches 
control to the prevention operation (DiffuseFault) once the 
fault has been identified.
These values indicate that execution of AES along with 
the proposed prevention mechanism is very much feasible in 
software. It is efficient, consumes less time, with no space 
overhead. With fewer numbers of rounds used for diffusion 
and the low price factor, software solutions for preventing fault 
attacks in AES can certainly be preferred over hardware. 
5. CONCLUSION
In this paper, an enhanced method for preventing fault 
attacks in AES is proposed. As proved in the literature, AES 
is prone to fault attacks which enable the attacker to obtain the 
encryption key by injecting faults into its state matrix. Since 
AES is one of the three main algorithms used to encrypt 4G-LTE 
networks, it is evident that an attack on AES could compromise 
the security of the 4G network itself. The proposed method 
integrates a combination of non-linear and linear diffusion 
techniques within a single function, which ensures that even 
if a fault has been injected, it is diffused well into the state 
matrix, such that an attacker would not be able to recover any 
information about the secret key. The software implementation 
of the proposed method is developed and compared with 
the existing solutions. After analysing the performance, the 
proposed method proves to be considerably better than the 
existing methods in terms of time, cost and efficiency.
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